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ABSTRACT
Adversarial examples provide an opportunity as well as impose a
challenge for understanding image classification systems. Based
on the analysis of state-of-the-art defense solutionâĂŤAdversar-
ial Logits Pairing (ALP), we observed in this work that: (1) The
inference of adversarially robust models tends to rely on fewer
high-contribution features compared with vulnerable ones. (2) The
training target of ALP doesn’t fit well to a noticeable part of sam-
ples, where the logits pairing loss is overemphasized and obstructs
minimizing the classification loss. Motivated by these observations,
we designed an Adaptive Adversarial Logits Pairing (AALP) solu-
tion by modifying the training process and training target of ALP.
Specifically, AALP consists of an adaptive feature optimization
module with Guided Dropout to systematically pursue few high-
contribution features, and an adaptive sample weighting module by
setting sample-specific training weights to balance between logits
pairing loss and classification loss. The proposed AALP solution
demonstrates superior defense performance on multiple datasets
with extensive experiments.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Computingmethodologies→Machine learning algorithms;
Computer vision.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Computer Vision discipline such as Image Classi-
fication has made a major breakthrough, however, an adversarial
attack can easily deceive these models [3, 10, 16, 22, 31]. Take Image
Classification as an example, Adversarial attack is a technic that
adds subtle perturbations which are hard for humans to detect in
order to change output result dramatically. Recently, the adversarial
attack is not limited in Image Classification problems but has been
expanded to Object detection, Face recognition, Voice recognition,
Text recognition [4, 8, 26, 34]. Hence, it is highly needed to design
such models to defend adversarial samples [7, 30].
Adversarial samples aim at influencing the output result of mod-
els dramatically via adding subtle perturbations based on original
databases. Szegedy first proposed the concept of building adversar-
ial samples by L-BFGS [31]. Subsequently, Goodfellow proposed a
better algorithm called FGSM [10]. Then an iteration attack algo-
rithm called PGD was proposed [21]. The algorithm of DeepFool
is used to find subtle perturbations [22]. The CW coordinated the
correlation between perturbation degree and attack intensity [3].
There are three main methods for defending existing adversarial
samples [1, 6, 11, 18–21, 24, 27, 28, 32, 33]: (1) Gradientmasking: Hid-
ing gradient information of images through nondifferentiable trans-
formation methods in order to invalidate adversarial attack [27].
(2) Preventing samples that have been attacked imported into the
model by detecting features of adversarial samples [9]. (3) Adver-
sarial training: By continuously adding adversarial samples into
the training-sets in order to get robust model parameters [21]. Lim-
itations of the gradient masking method have been discussed in
a paper [2] that the method can still be attacked successfully by
gradient simulation. Accordingly, adversarial training though has a
great demand for computing, it is still considered the most effective
method.
Adversarial training is a simple training framework that aims
at minimizing the cross-entropy of the original sample and adver-
sarial sample at the same time. Under the training framework of
adversarial training, Adversarial Logits Pairing (ALP) [13], which is
a more strict adversarial training constraint, acts more effectively.
When analyzing the result of models that got ALP, we found that
ALP loss led to different effects on different samples. By analyzing
the feature contribution of ALP, we found that the ALP training
method had great potential for training robust features.
Based on the above findings, we propose an Adaptive Adver-
sarial Logits Pairing training method, which greatly improves the
effectiveness of adversarial training. The main contributions of this
work are as follows:
• We propose a Guided Dropout that tailors features based
on feature contributions. It can prevent overfitting while
improving the model’s robustness.
• We propose a method to adaptively adjust the Adversarial
Logits Pairing loss.
• Our proposed method greatly improves the robustness of
the model against adversarial attacks and shows excellent
results on multiple datasets.
2 DATA ANALYSIS AND MOTIVATION
The Adversarial Logits Pairing is currently the best adversarial
training method. The Adversarial Logits Pairing consists of two
constraints, among which classification loss is used to constrain the
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correct classification of the model, and ALP loss constrains that the
original sample and the adversarial sample have the same output.
Where ALP loss is the loss [13] proposed in ALP, which is defined
as follows:
ALP loss = (Loдitsclean − Loдitsadv )2 (1)
where Loдitsclean and Loдitsadv refer to the activation value of
the original sample in the Logits layer and the activation value of
the adversarial sample in the Logits layer respectively.
We want to explore the mechanism of the ALP method and find a
general method for improving adversarial training. We will explore
the mechanism of the ALP method from the training process and
the training target. The data analysis part is intended to solve the
following two problems:
• How does the ALP method affect the model features after
training?
• Is the training target of the ALP method common to all
samples?
In this section, we define the PGD attack [21] as the adversarial
attack used, and the attack configuration is as follows: On the
MNIST dataset: ϵ = 0.3, attack step size = 0.01, interation = 40,
SVHN dataset [23]: ϵ = 12pix, attack step size = 3pix, interation =
10, CIFAR dataset [15]: ϵ = 8pix, attack step size = 2pix, interation
= 7.
2.1 Feature Change Analysis
Although the Adversarial Logits Pairing performs well, its mech-
anism is still unclear, the original author simply used ALP as an
extension of adversarial training, and did not analyze in-depth how
this extension improved the effect of adversarial training.
In this section, we will explore the mechanism of the ALP algo-
rithm through the feature level. For feature analysis, GradCAM [25]
is a commonly used tool, which can visualize the contribution of
features. GradCAM provides the activation map with the gradients
and activation of the models:
Grad CAM = relu( ∂Lossc
∂Ai
∗Ai ) (2)
where relu(.) represents the relu function, Lossc represents the
classification loss of the model for category c , and Ai refers to the
activation value of the layer i.
We visualized the adversarial sample’s activation maps of the
three methods: general training, adversarial training and ALP train-
ing in Fig. 1. It can be seen from the figure that as the robustness
of the model increases, the areas of the picture that are strongly
related to the model gradually decrease.
We want to further quantify the impact of feature contributions
on the robustness of the model, so we define the value of Rloss as
the contribution of the feature to the training target,
Rloss =mean(abs(
∂Loss
∂Af c
∗Af c )) (3)
where mean(.) represents the average function, abs(.) represents
the absolute value function, and Af c refers to the activation value
of the layer before the Logits layer.
We calculated the contribution of the previous layer of Logits
after convergence in the cifar10 dataset. Sort the contributions in
ascending order, and calculate the minimum number of features
required for each contribution ratio as shown in Fig. 2.
Figure 1: Changes in the activation map of adversarial sam-
ples in three different training methods. (From top to bot-
tom: activation maps for general training, adversarial train-
ing and ALP method)
Figure 2: Changes in feature distribution with different
contribution ratios under different training methods. (dark
blue: general training, green: adversarial training, light blue:
ALP training)
It can be seen from Fig. 2 that when the features present a few
high-contribution distributions, the model will show stronger ro-
bustness.
It can be seen from the difference in the activation maps and
distribution:
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• Robust model features have the distribution characteristics
of few high-contribution.
• Strongly related areas during training are also areas of greater
concern for neural networks.
The change in the activation map and the change in the contri-
bution distribution shows a high degree of consistency. This feature
distribution of the few high-contribution causes the model’s atten-
tion to focus on the most critical features in the image. Thereby
reducing the impact of other areas on the model output after being
attacked by adversarial.
This phenomenon inspired us to make the model pay more at-
tention to the most important part of the image during the training
process, so as to improve the robustness of the model.
2.2 Sample Generalization Analysis
In the previous section we found that the robust model presents the
distribution characteristics of few high-contribution features. The
strong contribution feature will bring strong confidence, and ALP is
a typical multi-loss collaborative task, and multi-loss collaborative
tasks are prone to interact with each other. So we want to know
whether the few high-contribution feature distribution will affect
the confidence of the model.
We chose the ALP model and found that the samples mainly
present two states in the three data sets MNIST, SVHN and Cifar10.
One type of successfully defended samples, the ground truth of the
original sample and the adversarial sample, both have high confi-
dence, while the other type of failed defense samples is generally
accompanied by lower confidence. The two types of samples are
shown in Fig. 3.
From the original intention of adversarial defense and ALP, we
don’t want the phenomenon that the original sample is correctly
classified and the adversarial sample is incorrectly classified, so we
define a type of sample with the original sample correct and the
adversarial sample wrong as the Inconsistent Set. Similarly, all cor-
rectly classified samples are defined as Consistent Set. Inconsistent
Set samples obviously violate the ALP training target, we want to
explore what causes such samples cannot be successfully defended
by the ALP model.
Because ALP pays more attention to the constraints of confi-
dence score, we decided to observe the confidence score in the
Inconsistent Set and use the samples in the Consistent Set to com-
pare to explore the characteristics of the samples that failed to
defend. We separately counted the clean sample ground-truth con-
fidence, adversarial sample ground-truth confidence, classification
loss, and ALP loss of the two types of samples in the test set, as
shown in the following Table. 1.
The above data analysis shows that the following differences
exist between Inconsistent Set and Consistent Set:
• Consistent Set’s clean sample average confidence and adver-
sarial sample average confidence are much higher than that
of Inconsistent Set.
• Inconsistent Set’s classification loss and ALP loss are much
higher than that of Consistent Set.
• The percentage of ALP loss taking over total loss in Consis-
tent Set is less than it in Inconsistent Set.
MNIST
SVHN
Cifar10
Figure 3: On the left is a class of data with correct classifica-
tion of the original and adversarial samples, on the right is
a class of data with correct original samples but wrong ad-
versarial samples, the first row of each group of figures is
the original sample, the second row is the adversarial sam-
ple, green bars Is the confidence score of ground Truth, and
the red bar is the confidence score of the attack target class.
MNIST Probsclean Probsadv Classification loss ALP loss
Consistent Set 94.61% 92.58% 0.3262 0.1443
Inconsistent Set 60.94% 21.87% 4.1833 2.2442
SVHN Probsclean Probsadv Classification loss ALP loss
Consistent Set 86.25% 52.37% 5.1866 0.9199
Inconsistent Set 54.61% 11.22% 7.0301 3.0740
Cifar10 Probsclean Probsadv Classification loss ALP loss
Consistent Set 89.53% 69.81% 2.0889 0.5236
Inconsistent Set 59.88% 14.34% 6.2318 2.7438
Table 1: Confidence score, classification loss, and alp loss be-
fore and after the adversarial attack in Inconsistent Set and
Consistent Set.
In the data analysis of Consistent Set and Inconsistent Set, we
guessed that Inconsistent Set had an adverse effect on the training
target of adversarial training, so we decided to observe the differ-
ence between Inconsistent Set and Consistent Set during the entire
ALP training process.
We record the ALP loss value of the model for each sample of
the test set after the end of each epoch in the training process
and divided the samples into Consistent Set and Inconsistent Set
according to the situation of the model convergence. Then print the
average ALP loss of each epoch of Consistent Set and Inconsistent
Set, as shown in Fig. 4
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Figure 4: Inconsistent Set and Consistent Set ALP loss value
changes with the increase of training times.
It can be seen from the figure that during an ALP training pro-
cess, the ALP loss of Consistent Set gradually decreases, and the
robustness gradually increases under the constraint of ALP loss.
The ALP loss of Inconsistent Set is gradually increasing. Obviously,
the constraint of ALP loss is too strong for Inconsistent Set, which
affects the convergence of such samples.
Therefore, although the ALP algorithm plays a certain role in
defense, it does not have a good training target, which affects the
overall defense effect of the model. This phenomenon inspired us
to design an ALP loss that can treat Consistent Set and Inconsistent
Set differently, so as to achieve a better training effect.
3 METHOD
In this section, we will solve the problems in the ALPmethod in two
perspectives: (1) For optimizing the training process, we want to
give the model a higher priority to train high-contribution features.
(2) In order to alleviate the negative impact of the ALP loss on
Inconsistent Samples at the training target, we want to design an
adaptive loss that can coordinate different samples.
3.1 Adaptive Feature Optimization
According to the data analysis that focuses on high-contribution
features will help the model improve robustness. This phenomenon
motivates us to design an algorithm that is more inclined to train
high-contribution features.
In terms of model structure, the dropout layer is the most suit-
able model structure to achieve this demand. The initial design of
dropout is to solve the over-fitting phenomenon of the model [29].
By randomly cutting the model features, the quality of the model
features and the generalization of the model are improved. In re-
cent years, many algorithms have improved the performance of
the model by controlling the cutting process of the dropout layer,
such as combining attention with dropout [5]. Therefore, we want
to combine dropout and feature contribution to make the dropout
layer conform to certain rules for feature cutting, so that the features
have fewer high-contribution distribution characteristics, thereby
improving the robustness of the model.
We use the characteristics of the dropout layer to selectively tai-
lor the neural network. By keeping the highly contributed features
and cutting the weakly contributed features, we force the model
to pay more attention to the highly contributed features during
the training process. Specifically, in forwarding propagation, we
first calculate the contribution scores between each neuron in the
previous layer of the Logits layer, and then retain the first 50% of
neurons and discard the last 50% of neurons. Then, we update the
parameters of the model after trimming to realize Guided Dropout.
Rloss =mean(abs(
∂Loss
∂Af c
∗Af c )) (4)
where Af c represents the activation value of the previous layer
of Logits, abs(.) represents the absolute value function, mean(.)
represents the average function. The resulting Rloss is a vector
with the same shape as Af c , which stores the contribution scores
of each feature of the Af c layer with the current round of data.
Guided Dropout =
siдn(Rloss −middle(Rloss )) + 1
2 (5)
where middle(.) represents the median function.Wewant to keep
the high-contribution features in the training process to continue
training so that the contribution of those features becomes stronger.
After subtracting the median, the position of the high-contribution
node is greater than zero, otherwise, the position of the weakly
contributed node is less than zero, and then through a series of
operations such as symbolic functions, the high contributed feature
position is 1 and the weak contributed position is 0. Then the vector
is regarded as the mask of the dropout, so as to realize the guided
dropout.
3.2 Adaptive Sample Weighting
As analyzed above that the ALP loss does not have a good effect
on all samples, in the process of the ALP loss restraining the Incon-
sistent Samples, even the phenomenon of affecting normal conver-
gence appears. So we propose a training mode that can adaptively
adjust the weight of the ALP loss. We propose the Adaptive ALP
loss to adaptively control the ALP loss weight of different samples
in the training process. According to the experimental results in
the previous section, it is noted that the Inconsistent Set has a large
impact and the confidence of the Inconsistent Set is low, so in order
to weaken the negative impact of ALP on the loss, we propose to
use the confidence score to weight ALP loss. We first calculate the
confidence scores of the original samples and set these confidence
scores as the ALP loss weight of the samples in the training round.
Adaptive ALP loss can effectively distinguish the Consistent Sam-
ples and the Inconsistent Samples, reduce the ALP loss weight of the
Inconsistent Samples, and better help against training convergence.
At the same time, adaptive ALP loss will overall reduce the negative
impact of ALP loss during the entire training process, allowing the
model to converge faster.
Adaptive ALP loss = Probsclean ∗ALP loss (6)
where Probsclean denotes the clean sample’s confidence score of
the ground-truth.
The Adaptive ALP loss can still be further optimized, the Adap-
tive ALP loss is a constraint that acts on a single sample point,
which can make a sample and its adversarial sample closer in the
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Figure 5: AALP training framework. The upper and lower samples are randomly paired, and each sample calculates its Adap-
tive ALP loss, and the sample pairs are combined to calculate Matching ALP loss. Guided Dropout is in the layer before the
Logits layer.
feature space. If the robustness is further improved in a limited
feature space, it is necessary not only to make the sample points
similar to the position of the adversarial samples but also to make
the distance between the classes longer, thereby increasing the cost
of adversarial attack. Therefore, we propose Matching ALP loss for
the entire data set, the purpose is to gather samples of the same
category together, reduce the occurrence probability of Inconsistent
Samples, and increase the distance between classes, to improve the
model robustness.
We first define Avg Logits as the position of a single sample point
in the feature space. Avg Logits is the average value of the Logits
activation value of the clean sample and the Logits layer activation
value of the adversarial sample. Then we defined the function Equal
(., .) to judge whether the sample needs to be close or distant. If the
sample is the same for the label, it will be closer, if it is different, it
will be alienated. Finally, Matching ALP loss is defined as follows:
Avд Loдits =
Loдitsclean + Loдitsadv
2 (7)
Equal(a,b) =
{
1, if a = b
−1, if a , b, (8)
MatchinдALP loss = L(AvдLoдitsi ,AvдLoдitsj )∗Equal(Labeli ,Labelj )
(9)
where L(a,b) denotes to the distance between a and b, here we use
Cosine Distance.
The overall loss is calculated as follows:
Total loss = Classi f ication Loss + α ∗Adaptive ALP loss
+β ∗Matchinд ALP loss (10)
where α and β are the weights of the Adaptive ALP loss and Match-
ing ALP Loss
4 EXPERIMENT
In the experimental part, wewant to verify whether the design goals
of the algorithm are met: whether the performance of AALP loss on
the Consistent and Inconsistent Sets solves the impact on the loss,
and whether the Guided Dropout makes the feature contribution
higher. At the same time, observe the adversarial defense effect and
analyze the parameter selection.
4.1 Experimental Setting
The Adaptive ALP experiment was carried out on three datasets and
models, LeNet [17] trained based on MNIST dataset, ResNet9 [12]
trained based on SVHN dataset and ResNet32 trained based on
Cifar10 dataset. MNIST basic configuration: Backbone network is
LeNet, using Adam optimization [14], lr = 0.0001, PGD40 is used for
creat the adversarial samples, attack step size 0.01, ϵ = 0.3. SVHN
basic configuration: backbone network is ResNet9, using Adam
optimization, lr = 0.0001, select PGD10 to generate the adversarial
samples, attack step size 3pix, ϵ = 12pix. The basic configuration of
Cifar10: backbone network is ResNet32, using Adam optimization,
lr = 0.00001, select PGD7 to generate the adversarial samples, attack
step size 2pix, ϵ = 8pix.
4.2 Performance on Adversarial Defense
We conducted a defense effect test on three datasets, comparing
Madry’s adversarial training algorithm and Kannan’s ALP algo-
rithm. We choose FGSM, Iter-LL10, PGDX, CWX (X represents the
number of iterations) as the comparative attack algorithm.
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SVHN
Clean FGSM Iter-LL10 PGD10 PGD20 PGD40 PGD100 CW10 CW20 CW40 CW100
RAW 95.57% 8.85% 24.50% 2.23% 2.22% 2.25% 2.17% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Madry adv 86.41% 48.53% 51.92% 31.51% 27.44% 25.75% 25.02% 24.03% 20.91% 19.53% 18.76%
Kannan ALP 85.28% 53.47% 56.69% 40.05% 36.55% 35.07% 34.15% 31.17% 28.77% 27.55% 26.63%
AALPдd 86.23% 59.18% 60.21% 44.05% 42.57% 42.27% 41.23% 37.57% 36.19% 35.54% 35.24%
AALPsw 84.69% 55.15% 57.92% 44.30% 40.99% 40.99% 39.94% 34.27% 32.07% 31.09% 30.43%
AALP 84.13% 57.67% 63.20% 45.05% 43.35% 42.60% 42.18% 38.63% 37.66% 37.13% 36.90%
Table 2: Comparison of defense performance with Madry, Kannan and others under different adversarial attack methods on
the SVHN dataset.
CIFAR-10
Clean FGSM Iter-LL10 PGD10 PGD20 PGD40 PGD100 CW10 CW20 CW40 CW100
RAW 90.51% 14.24% 28.66% 5.93% 5.80% 5.97% 6.04% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Madry adv 83.36% 63.28% 61.61% 49.29% 45.25% 44.85% 44.72% 37.21% 36.27% 35.92% 35.79%
Kannan ALP 82.80% 64.96% 62.72% 52.79% 49.04% 48.81% 48.60% 41.35% 40.43% 40.11% 40.00%
AALPдd 80.50% 65.00% 63.69% 54.78% 51.69% 51.51% 51.40% 43.08% 42.46% 42.24% 42.110%
AALPsw 82.37% 65.69% 63.37% 53.96% 50.25% 49.91% 49.74% 42.59% 41.64% 41.43% 41.31%
AALP 80.45% 65.42% 64.25% 55.23% 52.50% 52.41% 52.38% 43.58% 42.92% 42.76% 42.68%
Table 3: Comparison of defense performance with Madry, Kannan and others under different adversarial attack methods on
the Cifar10 dataset.
MNIST
Clean FGSM PGD40 PGD100
RAW 99.18% 7.72% 0.64% 0.53%
Madry adv 99.00% 96.92% 94.14% 92.49%
Kannan ALP 98.77% 97.68% 96.37% 94.50%
AALPдd 98.16% 98.17% 96.71% 95.72%
AALPsw 98.16% 97.77% 96.66% 95.87%
AALP 98.49% 98.19% 97.15% 96.32%
Table 4: Comparison of defense performance with Madry,
Kannan and others under different adversarial attack meth-
ods on the MNIST dataset.
On the MNIST dataset, AALP performs well. In the case of very
limited improvement space, the AALP algorithm still improves
the defense effect by nearly 1% compared to the ALP algorithm
in multiple attack modes. Especially under the attack of PGD100,
AALP improved by nearly 2% compared to the ALP algorithm.
On the SVHN dataset, we can see that AALP has significantly
improved the defense of the three algorithms Iter-LL, PGD, and
CW. In the defense of the FGSM algorithm, the AALP algorithm
performs slightly inferior to the ALP algorithm, butAALPдd can still
maintain the same and slightly higher results as the ALP algorithm.
On the Cifar10 dataset, the performance of the AALP algorithm
is similar to that of the SVHN dataset, and the overall defense
of the iterative attack algorithm has been significantly improved.
For the single step attack, FGSM improved slightly, but it was not
significant.
Compared with the Mardy’s adversarial training and Kannan’s
ALP methods, we can obviously observe that the AALP training
Figure 6: AALP’s defense performance under different
weight parameter configurations, the left figure shows the
change of α when β = 0.6, the right figure shows the change
of β when α = 1.0.
method has significantly improved the adversarial defense effect,
especially in the iterative attack.
4.3 Parameter Analysis
The algorithm we proposed has two main parameters that can be
adjusted, namely α and β which control the loss ratio. We selected
the SVHN dataset for parameter analysis. It was found that when α
= 1.0 and β = 0.6 were selected, overall good results were obtained.
We also show the change of β when α = 1.0 and the change of α
when β = 0.6.
In Fig. 6, it can be seen that β is not sensitive to changes. When
β = 0.6, better results can be obtained. When β is larger, the ac-
curacy of clean examples will be improved, but the accuracy of
adversarial examples will be reduced. The change of α has obvious
effects on defense. When you increase α , it will obviously improve
the defense effect, but it will also lose the clean classification accu-
racy, so we chose The final result is α = 1.0, which is better for the
overall result.
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Figure 7: Changes in the number of features with different
contribution ratios under the AALP training method, the
yellow line is the AALP training method.
4.4 Fewer High-Contribution Features
In the previous data analysis, we found that models with stronger
robustness usually have fewer high-contribution features, and these
high-contribution features are usually concentrated in the parts
that are crucial for classification.
In Fig. 7, we also added the feature contribution of the AALP
model to the comparison and found that the model trained by the
AALP algorithm has more characteristics of few high-contribution
features.
In Fig. 8, we compared the three defense algorithms ADV, ALP
and AALP, and their difference in the activation map, found that
the model trained by the AALP algorithm is more willing to focus
the attention on the parts that are important for classification.
At the same time, we also observed the changes in the distribu-
tion of features throughout the AALP training process. We trained
an AALP model and saved a model every 10000 steps. We recorded
the feature distribution of each storage point and the activation
map of the model under the storage point to obtain the Fig. 9 and
Fig. 10:
It can be seen that as the training progresses, the distribution
of model features gradually shows a few high-contribution trends,
and the activation map is also increasingly focused on the key
information of the picture.
We also want to test whether Guided Dropout can also play a
role in other training methods. We use the Resnet9 to train on the
SVHN dataset, add the Guided Dropout module to general training
and adversarial training(ADV), and observe its working effect.
From the data, it can be seen that the addition of Guided Dropout
has played a huge role in defending the adversarial samples. After
adding the Guided Dropout module, the ADVmodel and ALPmodel
have significantly improved the defense PGD and CW algorithms.
The ADV model has also significantly improved the classification
of clean samples. However, Guided Dropout does not seem to work
for general training. It makes the accuracy of clean samples slightly
lower, although the defense adversarial samples have improved,
but to no avail.
Figure 8: Change of activation map of adversarial samples
in the different training methods. (From top to bottom: acti-
vation maps for general training, adversarial training, ALP
method and AALP method)
Figure 9: Changes of feature distribution in the process of
training AALP.
4.5 The Changes of Consistent Set and
Inconsistent Set
We compared the changes in the Consistent Set and the Inconsistent
Set of the model and the changes in the number of samples of
these two types after using the AALP method. We set the clean
sample’s confidence scores to the x-axis and the adversarial sample’s
confidence scores to the y-axis to show the changes of the samples
in the entire test set. In Fig. 11, the blue sample points are the
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Figure 10: Changes of activationmap in the process of train-
ing AALP.
clean PGD10 CW10
Raw 95.57% 2.23% 0.0%
Raw+gd 94.36% 3.17% 0.04%
ADV 86.41% 31.51% 24.03%
ADV+gd 95.07% 35.34% 34.51%
ALP 85.28% 40.05% 31.17%
AALPдd 86.23% 44.05% 37.57%
Table 5: Cooperation between Guided Dropout and other al-
gorithms.
ALP Consistent Samples AALP Consistent Samples
MNIST 94.91% 96.03%
SVHN 30.89% 36.58%
Cifar10 41.61% 43.78%
Table 6: Consistent Set samples proportion change after us-
ing the AALP method.
Consistent Samples, and the red sample points are the Inconsistent
Samples.
Through the comparison of the three datasets, it can be found
that the sample points of the model trained by AALP tend to be
distributed on the straight line y = x . It shows that adversarial
attack has a lower impact on the output of the AALP model’s
confidence, and the AALP model has stronger robustness.
Then we compare the changes in the proportion of the Inconsis-
tent Samples in the three datasets.
It can be seen from the Table 6 that under the AALP algorithm,
the number of the consistent samples in all three data sets has in-
creased, and the robustness of the model has also been significantly
enhanced.
We trained two MNIST models, one using the ALP method and
one using the AALP method, and recorded the loss changes of the
test set and the accuracy of clean samples and adversarial samples
during the training of the two models.
ALP AALP
MNIST
SVHN
Cifar10
Figure 11: The confidence distribution map of clean sam-
ples and adversarial samples in the test set, the blue sample
points are Consistent Samples, and the red sample points
are Inconsistent Samples.
Figure 12: ALP and AALP training methods convergence
speed comparison.
In Fig. 12, it can be seen that the AALP algorithm has a better
convergence effect than theALP algorithm, and theAALP algorithm
has a clear advantage over the ALP algorithm in the defense effect.
At the same time, the proposed algorithm solves the problem
of ALP loss constraints on different samples, it reduces the side
effects of ALP loss during the training process, accelerates the
entire training process, and greatly improves the efficiency of ALP
training.
5 CONCLUSIONS
This work qualitatively and quantitatively analyzes the problems
in the ALP method: (1) the robust model should rely more on high-
contribution features (2) the ALP training target cannot fit all sam-
ples. Therefore, we proposed the AALP method, improved the ALP
method from the training process and training target, solved the
Adaptive Adversarial Logits Pairing
problems, and analyzed the AALP method qualitatively and quanti-
tatively. In the future, we plan to continue to explore the reasons
behind the relationship between feature contributions and robust-
ness, and better apply this phenomenon to adversarial defense or
other computer vision tasks.
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